Theories of democratic governance assume that citizens hold politicians accountable for their performance in providing public services. This study shifts the debate on public services to bureaucratic accountability. Since the accountability relationships among citizens, service providers, and bureaucrats are embedded in the local social context, the character and density of local social ties, the study argues, are likely to condition the accountability relationships among citizens, service providers, and local bureaucrats. Specifically, in social contexts which allow for stronger and denser information flows and sanctioning mechanisms, local public investments are likely to translate into better outcomes, and henceforth, higher satisfaction with government performance. Using an original panel dataset containing detailed information on education and health investments and electoral outcomes in Turkey, the study finds that particularly health investments have a positive effect on the vote share of the incumbent government. However, consistent with the theoretical expectations, this positive effect is limited only to small and non-Kurdish districts, where social ties of citizens vis-a-vis service providers and bureaucrats are presumably stronger. A crucial contribution of this study is that the effect of public investments on local outcomes and incumbent support is not uniform.